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Theme: This paper describes the Latino vote in the 2004 presidential election. It pays 
particular attention to conflicting claims regarding the extent to which Latinos voted for 
President Bush. It also evaluates the overall impact Latinos had on the result of the 
elections. 
 
Summary: The Latino vote in 2004 closely resembled the patterns of 2000. Most 
noteworthy is that despite claims to the contrary, there is no evidence of a substantial 
increase in support for President Bush. To the contrary, evidence from pre-election polls 
documents a consistent pattern of Democratic support. Moreover, exit polls showing an 
increase in Republican voting are methodologically flawed and unreliable. Also, given that 
neither party tried to mobilise Latinos in California, Texas, New York or Illinois, states 
where the majority of Latinos reside, it is reasonable to conclude that Latino Democrats 
turned out at unusually low rates. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the votes Bush 
received in 2004 overstate his real level of support among Latinos. 
 
 
Analysis: The 2004 election lived down to expectations. It closely followed the pattern set 
in 2000. That is, President Bush’s victory slightly expanded his electoral base by adding 
Iowa and New Mexico to the states he carried previously while only losing New 
Hampshire from the states he won in 2000. Additionally while he lost the popular vote in 
2000 by 539,947 votes, in 2004 he won it by 3,311,608, increasing his percentage of the 
vote from 48% to 51%. President Bush, thus, won in 2004 with a small minority that 
provides a legitimate basis for claiming a clear victory but not a mandate. 
 
Preliminary analysis cites three unexpected patterns to explain these results. The least 
controversial of these is that, consistent with opinion polls entering the final weeks of the 
campaign, exit polls found that instead of strongly supporting the Democratic candidate as 
they historically have done, women –who constitute 54% of the electorate– increased the 
support they gave to Bush by 5% and narrowed the Democratic candidate’s normally 
robust majority among women to 51%-48%. This swing alone accounts for much of 
Bush’s victory margin. 
 
A second but much more dubious claim is that Bush’s victory was heavily influenced by 
voters’ concern with ‘moral values’. The validity of this assertion is muddled because of 
how the exit polls operationalised this concept. Rather than specific items regarding issues 
such as gay marriage and abortion, the exit polls relied on a general category of ‘moral 
issues’, the saliency of which is unknown. Post-election surveys found that the importance 
of moral values varies with how the question is framed. When comparing the significance 
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of moral values with Iraq and terrorism, 27% indicate greater concern for the former, but 
when asked to identify the issue that most influenced their vote, significantly fewer (14%) 
mentioned moral values. Also, while 44% of those who chose moral values as the most 
important factor in their vote say the term relates to specific concerns over social issues, 
such as abortion and gay marriage, the majority referred to more general issues such as the 
candidates’ personal qualities or to religion and values in general. This ambiguity ensures 
that the meaning and impact of moral values will be the focus of extensive research in the 
future. 
 
 
 
The third and perhaps most unexpected claim regarding the outcome of the election 
concerns the alleged dramatic increase in Hispanic support for Bush. Initially, the National 
Election Pool conducted by Edison Mitofsky reported that Bush received 44% of the 
Latino vote, up from 35% in 2000. Numerous Latino and non-Latino commentators began 
using this figure as proof that Latinos could no longer be seen as part of the core 
Democratic vote but were instead swing voters who would respond to whichever party and 
candidate made them the best offer. The most outlandish such claim was by Dick Morris, 
the well known political consultant whose former clients include the President, who 
announced that ‘the biggest reason for Bush’s victory was that he finally cracked the 
Democratic stranglehold on the Hispanic vote’.1
 
There are several reasons why the accuracy of the alleged 44% total cannot withstand 
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scrutiny, however. First, that total is based on results from state-level exit polls. The extent 
to which these are flawed is especially evident from the Texas sample which like 
California includes 25% of all Latino voters. Because of its size, Texas’ results heavily 
influence national Hispanic tallies. The Texas exit polls were based on interviews in 
twenty sites, far fewer than the 35 each in Arizona and New Mexico which together 
include less than 8% of Latino voters. Clearly, the number of interview sites in Texas is 
too few to include a representative Hispanic sample. Thus, the exit survey results showing 
that Bush received 59% of the state’s Hispanic vote are not based on reliable data. 
Reinforcing this conclusion is that Kerry’s support in highly Hispanic Texas counties 
ranged from 55%-70% or more. As one well known analyst points out, there are not 
enough probable Hispanic Republican votes in the rest of the state to get to the proclaimed 
59% level.2
 
This pattern is replicated across the country. In California, the most egregious case outside 
of Texas, NEP reports Latino support for Bush was 32%, an increase of 4% over 2000. 
Given this minimal increase, for Latino support to have reached the total support reported 
in the NEP for the western states as a whole, Hispanics in the remaining western states 
‘must have supported Bush at the rate of 167%’.3 In other words, either there was massive 
vote fraud or the exit polls were systematically flawed. 
 
Other pollsters conclude that Hispanic support for Bush remained virtually unchanged 
from 2000. Zogby International argues that Bush received 33%-38% of the vote. Using a 
national sample of 5,154 Hispanics interviewed at 136 polling places, the Willie Velasquez 
Institute found only 33% support for Bush. Ruy Teixera, interpreting all the available data, 
concludes that no more than 39% voted for Bush. 
 
Supporting this pattern are the results of public opinion polls conducted from July up to the 
election. The Washington Post/Univision/Tomás Rivera Policy Institute national polls in 
July and late October national surveys showed Latino Democrats identifiers totalled 66%, 
compared with 24% Republicans and 60% of likely voters supporting Kerry. Moreover, as 
Table 1 illustrates, no poll showed Bush receiving more than 34% of the Latino vote. 
Unlike the case of women voters there were no indications that Hispanics were switching 
to President Bush. 
 
Table 1. Latino Political Preferences in Pre-Election Polls 
Survey Sponsor Date Number Bush (%) Kerry (%) 
Bendixen & Associates 6/3/2003 800 34 48^
Democracy Corps 2/16/2004 1,564 34 56 
Miami Herald/Zogby 4/01/2004 1,000 33 58 
Gallup 6/30/2004 500 38 57 
Washington Post/TRPI 7/16/2004 1,605 30 60 
Pew Hispanic Center 7/20/2004 751 32 62 
Democracy Corps 7/22/2004 1,000 30 61 
Bendixen & Associates* 9/20/2004 900 29 64 
Washington Post/TRPI 10/15/2004 1,603 30 60 
Miami Herald/Zogby 10/24/2004 1,000 33 61 
2004 Survey Average 2/04 – 10/04 9,923# 32 60 
 
Moreover, the Washington Post/Univision/TRPI polls show fewer than 35% of Latinos in 
all standard demographic categories supported Bush (see Table 2). The only exceptions are 
non-Catholics and born-again Christians, which are small non-standard categories. 
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Table 2. Latino Vote Preference by Demographic Characteristics 
 Kerry (%) Bush (%) Undecided (%) N 
Total 59.4 30.0 9.4 1,603 
Likely voters 60.6 29.8 8.6 1,390 
Less HS 63.5 23.5 10.3 489 
HS Grad 57.9 32.8 8.2 369 
College 58.6 33.9 6.4 664 
Less 25K 59.5 29.6 9.3 442 
25 – 49K 63.5 28.3 7.5 402 
More 50K 62.0 33.7 2.7 375 
Immigrant 57.3 31.2 10.7 845 
Native – 2nd 65.8 25.9 6.7 374 
Native – 3rd 60.0 31.0 7.6 361 
18 – 39 58.9 30.9 8.1 420 
40 – 59 61.9 29.7 7.4 621 
60 and over 59.4 29.9 10.3 493 
Catholic 66.4 23.9 8.7 1,146 
Non-Catholic 38.3 51.1 8.8 329 
Born again 47.0 41.7 9.5 436 
Source: Washington Post/Univision/TRPI National Survey of Latino Voters, October 15, 2004. 
 
Given these consistent patterns, it is easier to believe that the exit polls mistakenly depict 
the Latino vote than to accept that Latino preferences could have changed so substantially 
in such a short period. As Fernando Guerra, a widely respected Hispanic analyst states, 
‘there is nothing special that Bush did to get a higher turnout. What would explain this 
(alleged) tremendous amount of Latino support for Bush?’ 
 
There is also no evidence in TRPI’s July and October surveys that Latino fundamentalists 
and highly religious Catholics could have produced the increase in Bush’s support as 
described in exit polls. While Latino evangelicals favoured Bush over Kerry by 58% to 
33%, and 49% of other Christians also supported him, 68% of Latino Catholics and 62% 
of non-Christians or seculars supported Kerry. Latino non-Catholic Christians thus made 
up part of the core of religious voters that contributed to Bush’s victory. However, non-
Catholics are only 18% of the Latino electorate. Thus, even with their high levels of 
support the Latino Christian vote could not have pushed Bush’s overall support far along 
the road to 44%. 
 
What does all this suggest about the Latino vote in 2004? First, despite claims to the 
contrary, there is no clear evidence that, overall, Republicans significantly increased their 
share of the Latino vote. Indeed, the NEP admitted as much when it announced in early 
December that it was lowering its estimate of Bush’s Latino vote to 40%. This estimate 
suffered from some of the same flaws as the original estimate, however, and there is no 
persuasive reason for accepting it. Nonetheless, Republicans seem to have increased their 
vote in some states but not in others. For example, Republicans apparently increased their 
support in New Mexico where it is reasonable to conclude that their support helped 
President Bush carry the state, but their share of Latino votes in Florida seems to have 
declined. 
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Second, despite a record high of approximately 7 million voters, the Latino vote did not 
significantly affect the results of the 2004 election. This was primarily because most 
Latino voters reside in states won by Democrats. In Texas, Arizona, Nevada and Colorado, 
Latino majorities voted for Kerry but President Bush carried these states. Only in Florida 
does it appear that a majority of Hispanics voted for the winning candidate, President 
Bush, but there his margin of victory was so substantial that he would have carried the 
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state even if he had received no Hispanic support. 
 
The results in New Mexico are unclear. While it seems that Latino voters were crucial to 
President Bush’s victory, it is unclear what proportion of the Hispanic vote he received. 
With or without a majority, however, there is little doubt that Hispanic voters played their 
most important role in this state. While significant, it must be recognised that helping to 
carry this state added to Bush’s overall triumph but was not crucial to it. That is, he would 
have won the election even if he had lost New Mexico. 
 
Third, there is no evidence that Latinos are swing voters. A consistent percentage of 
Hispanics identify as and vote for Democrats. Evidence of this consistency may be seen in 
the continuous election of Democrats at all levels, from the highest such as US Senator to 
local councilmen in all states except Florida. While this might change in the future, there is 
no evidence of movement in that direction at present. As of October, 2004, for example, 
67% of likely voters identified as Democrats compared with 24% who identified as 
Republicans. Also, almost 40% more Hispanic likely voters say that the Democrats are 
more concerned about Latinos than are the Republicans. 
 
Fourth, it is clear that electoral strategies designed around the structure of the Electoral 
College dampen Latino turnout. Candidates have no incentive to campaign in states that 
they are certain to win or lose. All too often, this includes those states with the largest 
concentrations of Hispanics. Such strategies not only reduce their role in presidential 
elections, but by marginalising Latinos from presidential campaigns they also deprive 
them from gaining the experience needed to develop national political operatives and a 
mobilised electorate. 
 
In 2004, the result of such campaigns contributed greatly to the confusion regarding 
increased Latino Republicanism. Given that neither party had an incentive to mobilise 
Hispanics in California, Texas, New York or Illinois, where 60% of Latino voters reside, 
there is at present no data on whether those Latinos who turned out were representative of 
all Hispanic registered voters or whether they were disproportionately Republican. Until 
that issue is clarified, any claims regarding Latino electoral preferences in 2004 are 
incomplete at best. In the absence of these data, one conclusion that seems clear is that the 
Latino vote in 2004 maintained its well-established Democratic commitment. 
 
An equally clear second result is that the Latino vote is a major component of the 
Democratic core. This means that if the Democratic Party is to regain electoral supremacy, 
it will have to build on its Latino foundation. This will be especially significant in states 
with well established but rapidly increasing Hispanic electorates like Arizona, Nevada and 
Colorado where mobilised Latino voters can take advantage of a divided Anglo electorate 
to carry the state for the Democrats. It will also be important in key states such as 
Michigan and Pennsylvania, to name just two, where a small Hispanic population may 
have great electoral influence because the Anglo population is so evenly divided between 
the two major parties. To reach these voters will require more than symbolic outreach, 
however. It will necessitate long term investments in immigrant naturalisation 
programmes, voter registration drives and get-out-the-vote campaigns as well as the 
development of a policy agenda that is attentive to Latino concerns. 
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Conclusion: The year 2004 saw little change from the Latino perspective. Once again, 
Latino voters did not influence the outcome of the election, nor did they abandon the 
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Democrats for the Republicans as has been so widely proclaimed. They did, however, 
solidify their Democratic commitment, which should serve them well in the future. That is, 
Republicans will likely realise that they need to find new ways to win Latino votes, and 
this probably means more substantive outreach. Democrats must recognise that to get the 
share of Latino votes they need to win in contested states they, too, must engage in a 
variety of outreach efforts as well as develop a policy agenda reflective of Latino concerns. 
The results of the 2004 election can be read to show this and, to that extent, the 2004 
election may serve Latinos well in the future. 
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